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The Long and Large Decline 
in U.S. Output Volatility
SINCE THE EARLY 1980s the U.S. economy has gone through two long
expansions. The first, from 1982 to 1990, lasted thirty-one quarters. The
second started in 1991 and, although showing signs of faltering, has
recorded its fortieth quarter as this volume goes to press and is already
the longest U.S. expansion on record.
One view is that these two long expansions are simply the result of luck,
of an absence of major adverse shocks over the last twenty years. We argue
that more has been at work, namely, a large underlying decline in output
volatility. Furthermore, we contend, this decline is not a recent develop-
ment—the by-product of a “New Economy” or of Alan Greenspan’s talent.
Rather it has been a steady decline over several decades, which started in
the 1950s (or earlier, but lack of consistent data makes this difficult to
establish), was interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s, and returned to
trend in the late 1980s and the 1990s.1The magnitude of the decline is sub-
stantial: the standard deviation of quarterly output growth has declined
by a factor of three over the period. This is more than enough to account
for the increased length of expansions.
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1. What has happened to output volatility over a much longer time span is the subject
of a well-known debate, which this paper does not revisit. See Romer (1986), Weir (1986),
and Balke and Gordon (1989).
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decrease in volatility can be traced to a number of proximate causes, from
a decrease in the volatility of government spending early on, to a decrease
in consumption and investment volatility throughout the period, to a
change in the sign of the correlation between inventory investment and
sales in the last decade. Second, there is a strong relationship between
movements in output volatility and movements in inflation volatility. The
interruption of the trend decline in output volatility in the 1970s was asso-
ciated with a large increase in inflation volatility; the return to trend is
associated with the decrease in inﬂation volatility since then.
This paper is organized as follows. We start by documenting our basic
fact, namely, the secular decrease in output volatility. We then look at the
stochastic process for GDP and show that this decrease in volatility can
be traced primarily to a decrease in the standard deviation of output
shocks, rather than to a change in the dynamics of output. Finally, we show
how this decrease in the standard deviation of shocks accounts for the
increased length of expansions.
We then take up the question of whether recessions are special, in a way
that the formalization used earlier does not do justice to. Put another way,
we ask whether what we have seen over the last twenty years is simply
the absence of large shocks and nothing more. We show that this is not
the case. The measured decrease in output volatility has little to do with
the absence of large shocks in the recent past.
We then turn to the relationship between output volatility and infla-
tion. We show that there is a strong relationship both between output
volatility and the level of inﬂation, and between output volatility and inﬂa-
tion volatility. Both volatilities went up in the 1970s and have come down
since. Correlation does not, however, imply causality. The correlation in
both periods may have been due to third factors, such as supply shocks in
the 1970s. This leads us to consider evidence from the other members of
the Group of Seven (G-7) large industrial countries. Our motivation here is
that the different timings of disinﬂation across these countries can help us
separate out the effects of inflation from those of supply shocks. We first
show that these other countries have also experienced a decline in output
volatility, although with some differences in timing and in magnitude. (An
interesting exception is Japan, where a decline in output volatility has been
reversed since the late 1980s.) We then show that, even after controlling
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strongly related to output volatility.
As a matter of accounting, the decline in output volatility can be traced
either to changes in the composition of output or to changes in the variances
and covariances of its underlying components. We therefore look at the
components of GDP and ﬁnd that, at least at the level of disaggregation at
which we operate, changes in composition explain essentially none of the
trend decline. The composition of GDP has changed, but the effects of
the various changes have mostly cancelled each other out. We also find
that, apart from a decrease in the volatility of government spending early
in the postwar period, most of the decrease in output volatility can be
traced to a decrease in both consumption volatility and investment volatil-
ity, and more recently to a change in inventory behavior, with inventory
investment becoming more countercyclical.
We conclude by discussing the agenda for further research. In particu-
lar, it is clear that we have addressed only the proximate causes of the
volatility decline. The deeper causes, from changes in financial markets
to better countercyclical policy, remain to be identiﬁed.
The Decline in Output Volatility
Figure 1 shows the rolling standard deviation of quarterly real output
growth (measured at a quarterly rate) since the first quarter of 1952. The
measure of output is chain-weighted GDP. We use a window of twenty
quarters, so that the standard deviation reported for quarter t is the esti-
mated standard deviation over quarters t – 19 to t. The ﬁrst available obser-
vation for chain-weighted GDP is 1947:1, and so the first observation for
the standard deviation of the growth rate is 1952:1. The figure shows a
clear decline in the standard deviation over time, from about 1.5 percent a
quarter in the early 1950s to less than 0.5 percent in the late 1990s. This
decline is not continuous, however. Volatility increases from the late 1960s
to the mid-1980s, and this is followed by a sharp decline in the second half
of the 1980s.
One can think of other ways of measuring volatility. One alternative is
to look at the standard deviation of an output gap, for example, the differ-
ence between the level of (the logarithm of) output and a Hodrick-
Olivier Blanchard and John Simon 137
0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 137Prescott-filtered series.2 Another is to look at annual rather than quarterly
changes in GDP. These alternatives yield very similar conclusions. The
basic reason is that the standard deviation of quarterly output growth
primarily reflects the high-frequency properties of the series, which are
largely invariant to the detrending method.
Changes in the Output Process
The natural next step is to think about the process generating output
movements over time and ask how it has changed. Does the lower volatil-
ity of output reflect a lower standard deviation of output shocks, or a
change in the dynamic process through which these shocks affect output,
or both?
More concretely, assume that output growth follows an autoregressive
(AR) process given by 
( ) ( – ) ( )( – ) , – 1 1 ∆∆ yga Ly g tt t =+ ε
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2. This is the approach taken by Taylor (2000).
Figure 1. Volatility of Output Growth, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 138where yt denotes the logarithm of output in quarter t, ∆ denotes a ﬁrst dif-
ference, g is the underlying growth rate of output, εt is a white-noise shock
with standard deviation σε, and a(L) is a lag polynomial.
The standard deviation of output σy then depends both on the standard
deviation σεand on the lag polynomial a(L). If a(L) = a, for example, out-
put growth follows a ﬁrst-order AR process, and  so 
that the higher is a, the higher is the standard deviation of output.
With these points in mind, we estimate equation 1 over a rolling sample
from 1952:1 on, again with a window of twenty quarters. We assume the
process to be first-order autoregressive, or AR(1); although this does not
fully capture the dynamics of output growth, it makes for an easier inter-
pretation of the changes in the process, and all of our conclusions extend
to higher-order AR processes. The top panel of figure 2 shows the mean
growth rate thus estimated, the middle panel the estimated AR(1) coeffi-
cient, and the bottom panel the estimated standard deviation of the shock.
The other two lines in each panel show two-standard-deviation bands on
each side of the estimate.
The conclusions to be drawn from ﬁgure 2 are straightforward. Neither
the growth rate nor the AR(1) coefﬁcient shows clear movement over time.
The AR(1) coefﬁcient is slightly lower at the end of the 1990s than in the rest
of the sample, but the difference is not signiﬁcant.3 The standard deviation
of the regression residual shows the same time pattern as the standard devi-
ation of output growth in ﬁgure 1. Indeed, if plotted on the same graph (not
shown), their profiles would be nearly identical. In short, the decrease in
output volatility appears to come from smaller shocks, rather than from a
decrease in the persistence of the effects of these shocks on output.
Back to the Length of Expansions
Having estimated the process for output growth, we can return to the
issue of the length of expansions. We proceed in two steps. First we esti-
mate two processes, one for the period 1947 to 1981, the other for the
period 1982 to 2000. We choose the split in the sample to coincide with the
σσ ε y a = / – , 1
2
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3. A perhaps obvious point: changes in the estimated AR(1) coefﬁcient for this univari-
ate representation of output growth do not imply a change in the dynamic structure of the
economy. Output movements come from many underlying shocks, each with its own
dynamic effects. At different times, different shocks may dominate the (short) subsample
used for estimation, leading to different estimated univariate dynamics of output.
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Figure 2. Time Variation of Key Parameters, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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peak of the cycle preceding the last two expansions. The intent of the split
is to capture the major changes in the process between the start and the end
of the sample.
The estimated equations for the two subperiods are
and
Using the first estimated equation, we generate a sequence of 100,000
observations for output growth, based on draws of the shocks from a nor-
mal distribution. Following a long tradition of using a simple rule to
approximate the dating of recessions by the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), we define the beginning of a recession as two consec-
utive quarters of negative growth. Similarly, we deﬁne the beginning of an
expansion as two consecutive quarters of positive growth following a
recession. We then compute the mean and median lengths of expansions in
the sample of 100,000 observations. Finally, we repeat the process using
the second estimated equation.4
The results are shown in table 1. The estimates are seventeen and thir-
teen quarters for the mean and the median expansion length, respectively,
for the ﬁrst subsample; and ﬁfty-one and thirty-ﬁve quarters for the second
subsample. These means compare with actual mean expansion lengths of
nineteen quarters for 1950:1 to 1981:4 (with recessions defined by the
same rule as in the simulation, not by NBER dating) and thirty-six quarters
for 1982:1 to 2000:4 (but with the second expansion not having ended
yet). In other words, the differences between the two estimated AR
processes account well for the increase in expansion length from the first
to the second sample.
( – .) .( – .) , . ( – ∆∆ yy tt t 08 5 04 8 08 5 05 6 1 =+ = εσ ε for 1982–2000).
( – .) .( – .) , . ( – ∆∆ yy tt t 08 7 03 1 08 7 11 2 1 =+ = εσ ε for 1947–81)
4. Note that the average length of expansions is a very nonlinear function of the under-
lying parameters of the AR process. By construction, an expansion ends when a recession
starts; under our definition of a recession, this requires two consecutive quarters of nega-
tive growth. The probability of such an event depends nonlinearly on the average growth
rate, the standard deviation of the residual, and the AR(1) coefficient. If, for example, the
standard deviation is far below the average growth rate, small changes in the standard
deviation will have little effect on the probability of a recession. If it is closer, the same
small changes will have a substantial impact on the probability of a recession, and in turn on
the length of expansions.
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we next show the results of switching either the estimated mean growth
rate, or the AR(1) coefficient, or the standard deviation of the shocks,
across the two samples. Not surprisingly, given that the growth rates are
nearly the same in the two samples, switching them has no effect on the
length of expansions. Switching the AR(1) coefficients leads to shorter
expansions in the first subsample (because the effect of a negative shock
on output growth is now more persistent, making it more likely that output
will decrease for two quarters in a row), and longer ones in the second. But
nearly all the action comes from switching standard deviations. If the stan-
dard deviation had remained the same as in the first subsample, the mean
length of expansions would now be only fourteen quarters, and the median
eleven quarters. In short, the large decrease in the standard deviation of
output shocks is at the root of the two long expansions the United States
has recently experienced. And unless this changes, expansions are likely to
be much longer in the future than they were in the past.
Are Recessions Special?
A widespread view of recessions and of output volatility holds that the
estimation and the exercise we carried out in the previous section are
largely tautological at best, and misleading at worst. According to that
view, recessions are largely the result of infrequent large shocks—indeed,
sufﬁciently large and identiﬁable that they often have names: the ﬁrst and
second oil shocks, the Volcker disinﬂation, and so on. These shocks, in this
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Table 1. Actual and Simulated Lengths of Expansions, 1947–2000
Quarters
1947–81 1982–2000
Item Mean Median Mean Median
Actual 19 15 36 n.a.
Simulateda 17 13 51 35
Switching growth rate 17 12 55 38
Switching AR(1) coefﬁcient 15 11 83 55
Switching volatility 99 67 14 11
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Using parameters for each period that are estimated from actual data from that period. Additional simulations are per-
formed switching one parameter with its opposite-period counterpart, leaving all other parameters unchanged.
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in the measured decline in output volatility. We simply have not had large
shocks over the last two decades.5
To see whether this is indeed what has been going on, we explore two
approaches.6 First, we look at what happens to our measure of volatility
if we include a recession dummy. Second, we look for signs of large
shocks, and associated skewness and excess kurtosis, in the relevant dis-
tributions. Both approaches yield similar conclusions. The measured
decline in output volatility is not due to the absence of large shocks over
the last twenty years. What it captures instead is the decline in the volatil-
ity of “routine” quarter-to-quarter changes in GDP growth. 
If the decline in volatility simply reflected the absence of large negative
shocks and associated recessions, excluding recessions would eliminate
our finding of a decline in output volatility. Indeed, excluding recessions
from the sample is clearly too strong a correction under our null hypothe-
sis. It corresponds to eliminating large negative realizations just because
they happen to be large and negative. But if a decrease in volatility remains
even after this overly strong correction, it makes for convincing evidence. 
To implement this approach, we reestimate the same rolling AR regres-
sions as before, but we allow for the presence of a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 in each quarter of an NBER-dated recession. The
resulting time series for the estimated standard deviation of the residual
is plotted in figure 3, together with, for ease of comparison, the standard
deviation obtained without a recession dummy (from figure 2).7 The
results are quite clear. Output volatility is indeed lower in recessions (by
construction). But the general pattern is very similar, with a clear trend
downward, from roughly 1.2 percent a quarter at the start of the sample
to 0.4 percent at the end.
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5. This view was forcefully communicated to us by the editors at the start of this project.
6. Obviously, the fact that recessions are typically associated with negative realizations
of the output process is an implication of the definition of a recession, not an indication
that recessions are special in any particular way. In the same way, the fact that recessions
often come with unusually large negative realizations of the shocks also follows from the
deﬁnition of the recession, and from the fact that the distribution of shocks, conditional on
being in a recession, implies a higher probability of large negative shocks.
7. Introducing a dummy for recessions can be thought of as a way of allowing for a lower
mean growth rate in recessions. In this sense, this estimation is in the spirit of the Markov
switching process estimated by Hamilton (1989) for U.S. GDP.
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shocks. For example, if the economy is subject to two types of shocks, one
frequent and small, the other infrequent and large, we would expect the
distribution of output growth to exhibit either skewness or excess kurtosis,
or both. It would exhibit skewness if large, infrequent shocks are typi-
cally negative, and excess kurtosis if such shocks are equally likely to be
positive or negative. Other, more complex models of recessions have sim-
ilar implications. Although, from the Wold representation theorem, we
know that even these models are still consistent with the linear represen-
tation given by equation 1, the residuals are likely also to exhibit either
skewness or excess kurtosis.8
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8. Take, for example, the idea that serial correlation of output is greater in expansions
than in recessions, clearly a nonlinear feature. Capture this by assuming that output growth
is a two-state Markov process, with a high probability that output growth will remain high
if it is initially high, and a low probability that output growth will remain low if initially low.
It is easy to show that this Markov process will have an AR(1) representation given by equa-
tion 1, with the distribution of the residual skewed so that most residuals are small and
positive, but with a long negative tail associated with recessions.
Figure 3. Volatility of Output Shocks Including and Excluding a Recession Dummy
Variable, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Twenty-quarter rolling standard deviation of regression residuals from estimation of equation 1. Recession dummy variables
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residual obtained from the estimation of equation 1. The results are shown
in figure 4. Each point represents the estimate of skewness (top panel) or
excess kurtosis (bottom panel) of the residual from estimation of an AR(1)
process over the current and previous nineteen quarters. The two panels
also show the standard 95 percent conﬁdence bands for the hypotheses that
the true measure of skewness or excess kurtosis equals zero. The two pan-
els yield similar conclusions. Except for a brief period during the 1980
recession, there is little evidence of either significant skewness or signifi-
cant excess kurtosis.9
We have also explored other approaches. Following Blanchard and
Mark Watson,10 we estimated a specification in which the output shock is
assumed to be the sum of two underlying shocks, one drawn every period
from a normal distribution, the other equal to zero with probability (1 – p)
and drawn from a normal distribution with larger variance, with probabil-
ity p. We could not reject the hypothesis that p was equal to zero, and we
could not find evidence of a decrease in p over time. In other words, we
could not ﬁnd evidence that the decrease in output volatility has been due
to a decrease in the likelihood of large shocks over time.11
Output Volatility and Inﬂation
Having established the basic fact, we now turn to its interpretation.
There are at least two ways to look at the path of output volatility in
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9. Under the assumption that large shocks are indeed infrequent, the use of a short win-
dow (twenty quarters) implies that there are many subsample periods during which no
large shock occurs. Those subsamples will not show evidence of skewness or excess kur-
tosis. But we would expect many or most recessions to be associated with measured skew-
ness or excess kurtosis. This does not appear to be the case. Nor do we see more evidence of
skewness or excess kurtosis if we use a longer window. Over the sample as a whole, there
is indeed evidence of significant excess kurtosis, but this appears simply to be due to the
decrease in the standard deviation over time. (The distribution of draws from a set of normal
distributions with different variances will exhibit excess kurtosis.) Other evidence that
skewness and excess kurtosis are not important here is that the earlier simulation results on
expansion length are roughly unaffected if we draw shocks by sampling with replacement
from the estimated residuals rather than from a normal distribution, as we did in our sto-
chastic simulations earlier.
10. Blanchard and Watson (1986).
11. One hypothesis is that there are large shocks but that their effects appear over a few
quarters, making them more difﬁcult to detect. If this were the case, the results of our 
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Figure 4. Testing for Skewness and Excess Kurtosis, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 146ﬁgure 1 or, equivalently, at the path of the standard deviation of the resid-
ual in figure 2, as the two are nearly identical. The first, which we have
implicitly relied on until now, is to see the pattern as a trend decline, tem-
porarily interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s. This interpretation is
shown in the top panel of ﬁgure 5, which reproduces the path of the stan-
dard deviation of output growth from figure 1 and draws in addition an
estimated exponential trend over the period.
The second interpretation, which has been suggested in a number of
recent papers,12 instead invokes a step decrease some time in the early to
mid-1980s. This interpretation is shown in the bottom panel of figure 5,
which shows how an estimated step function can also fit the general pat-
tern of volatility. Here the step function is drawn assuming that the step
decline occurs in 1986:1. The more careful econometric work of Mar-
garet McConnell and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, who estimate rather than
assume the break date, finds a slightly earlier date, 1984:1, as the most
likely break point.13
This second interpretation suggests looking for factors in the economic
environment that changed around the mid-1980s. Plausible candidates
are an improvement in the conduct of monetary policy or changes in
inventory behavior.14
Under the first interpretation, however (which, we will argue, is more
likely to be the right one), one needs to look for two sets of factors: those
behind the underlying trend decline in volatility over the last ﬁfty years,15
and those behind the interruption of that trend in the 1970s. Put another
way, the focus shifts from what happened in the 1980s (to explain the
step decline in volatility) to what happened in the 1970s (to explain the
interruption of the trend for a bit more than a decade).
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exercise would be very different if we were to use lower-frequency data. In fact, the results
are nearly identical when using annual rather than quarterly data.
12. In particular, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
13. The difference comes from our use of a rolling window to capture volatility. A
decline in 1984:1 will not necessarily show up until enough earlier observations have
dropped out of the window—something that happened around 1986:1.
14. The first hypothesis is argued by, for example, Taylor (2000), and the second by
Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros (2001).
15. Or, indeed, over the past century, if one takes a longer view, informed by evidence
from earlier research on volatility since the late 1800s.
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Figure 5. Alternative Estimates of the Trend in Output Volatility, 1952–2000
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Twenty-quarter rolling standard deviation of quarterly real GDP growth.
b. Means for 1952–85 and 1986–2000.
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That the 1970s were different is not very controversial. The U.S. econ-
omy was affected by major increases in the prices of raw materials, includ-
ing oil. Inflation increased, to return to a lower level only after the
disinflation of the early 1980s. That these shocks, and perhaps inflation
itself, may have led to more output volatility does not seem implausible.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between inflation and output growth
volatility. The top panel plots output growth volatility against the twenty-
quarter rolling mean of the inﬂation rate, with inﬂation measured using the
GDP deflator. The bottom panel plots output volatility against inflation
volatility, both constructed as twenty-quarter rolling standard deviations.
All variables, including mean inﬂation, are measured at quarterly rates.
The temporary increase in output volatility in the 1970s and early 1980s
is clearly correlated with the temporary increase in the level of inflation.
Output volatility seems, however, more strongly related to the volatility
than to the level of inflation. Simple regressions of output volatility on
the level of inflation, inflation variability, and an exponential time trend
show all three factors to be signiﬁcant, with the level and the variability of
inﬂation playing roughly similar roles quantitatively, and the negative time
trend remaining important and statistically signiﬁcant.16
Correlation between inflation and output volatility, however, does not
imply causality from inflation to output volatility. At least one plausible
alternative is that the correlation reflects a common dependence of infla-
tion and output volatility on third factors, such as the supply shocks of
the 1970s. Here international evidence can help. First, and obviously, it
can tell us whether the patterns observed in the United States are repre-
sentative of what happened to output volatility, and to the relation between
output and inflation volatility, elsewhere. But also, if we are willing to
assume that the supply shocks of the 1970s were largely common across
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16. One worry is that measurement noise in the decomposition of nominal GDP will cre-
ate a spurious positive correlation between output and inflation volatility. But the results
are very similar if we use the consumer price index, where the issue is likely to be less impor-
tant. Another problem with regressions of this kind is the use of moving averages for stan-
dard deviations and means on both the left- and the right-hand sides. Estimation of a
potentially more appropriate GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedasticity) model for output growth, allowing the variance of output shocks to be a
function of inflation volatility, the inflation level, and a time trend, yields very similar
results.
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Figure 6. Relationship between Output Volatility and Inﬂation, 1952–2000
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Twenty-quarter rolling standard deviation of quarterly real GDP growth.
b. Twenty-quarter rolling mean of the quarterly inﬂation rate, as measured by the GDP deﬂator.





























0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 150countries, then cross-country evidence gives us a way of controlling for the
presence of these shocks, by treating them as fixed effects in a cross-
country panel regression. In other words, such a regression can help us
establish the relationship between output and inflation volatility, control-
ling for supply shocks. With this in mind, we now turn to the evidence
from the G-7 countries.
A Look at the Other Group of Seven Countries
Figure 7 shows the path of output volatility for all the G-7 countries.
For clarity’s sake, we have grouped the countries into three panels: the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada (top panel); France, Ger-
many, and Italy (middle panel); and Japan (bottom panel). In each case the
measure of output volatility is again the five-year rolling standard devia-
tion of output growth, using a window of twenty quarters. Because the data
we have start only in 1960 (in 1982 for Italy), the different measures are
available only from 1965:1 on (1987:1 for Italy), resulting in a shorter
sample than the one used for the United States above.
The top and the middle panels show that output growth volatility in
six of the G-7 countries has followed a roughly similar path over the
period. In all of these countries the standard deviation of output growth has
declined: whereas in the early 1960s it ranged from about 1.5 percent in
Germany to a little below 1.0 percent in the United States, by the late
1990s it was around 0.5 percent in all six countries. One of the striking
characteristics of these two panels is indeed how similar the standard devi-
ation of output growth is across these countries today. The general decline
and convergence suggest the presence of common, long-lasting forces
across countries. Looking more closely, however, there are also clear dif-
ferences across countries, especially in timing. After the general increase
of the early 1970s, the decrease in volatility took place earlier in Germany,
and later in Canada.
The only G-7 country where the pattern is clearly different is Japan.
After falling from the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the standard devia-
tion of Japanese output growth rose in the 1990s and is now higher than
it was at the start of the sample. To the extent that this increase largely
coincides with the long Japanese slump of the 1990s, it is tempting to
search in that direction for an explanation. For example, a decrease in liq-
uid asset holdings by both firms and consumers may have led to stronger
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Figure 7. Volatility of Output Growth in the G-7 Countries, 1965–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Datastream.
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0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 152effects of cash flows on consumption and investment, leading to stronger
multiplier effects of shocks on output. The zero floor on nominal interest
rates may have constrained monetary policy responses. We do not explore
these hypotheses further in this paper, but we find the coincidence of the
long slump and the increase in volatility intriguing and potentially useful
in learning what has happened in other countries.
Leaving Japan aside, we return to the relationship between output
volatility and inﬂation in the other six countries. To do so, we run the fol-
lowing panel regression:
where i indexes countries and t time, so that the βis are country fixed
effects, the βts are time ﬁxed effects, σy and σπ are rolling standard devia-
tions of output and inﬂation, and – π is a rolling mean of the inﬂation rate. 
If the effects of the supply shocks of the 1970s on output volatility were
indeed common across countries, this specification will give us the rela-
tionship between output volatility and inflation volatility, controlling for
supply shocks. The assumption is probably too strong, however: the effects
of supply shocks were different across countries, and these differences may
well have been associated with different paths through time of both the
level and the volatility of inﬂation. In this case the coefﬁcient on inﬂation
will still pick up some of the effects of supply shocks. Nevertheless, even in
this case, this cross-country speciﬁcation is an improvement over the U.S.
regression (in which we could not introduce fixed time effects) presented
earlier.(Note that, even under the assumption of common supply shocks,
this speciﬁcation does not resolve other potential identiﬁcation problems.
One of these is the possibility that the relationship between output volatil-
ity and inﬂation volatility reﬂects causality from output to inﬂation volatil-
ity, through the response of monetary policy, or a dependence on other,
third causes, such as an improvement in the conduct of monetary policy
leading to both lower output volatility and lower inﬂation volatility.)
Estimation yields coefficients of a1 = –0.02, with a t statistic of –0.7,
and a2 = 0.67, with a t statistic of 13.7. Thus it is inﬂation volatility, rather
than the level of inflation, that appears to matter, and to matter strongly.
The best way to summarize the implications of the regression is through
the three panels of figure 8. The top panel shows the actual and the fitted
values of output volatility for the United States (dropping  – πit from the
panel regression; nothing is changed by this). The conclusion to be drawn
is that the panel speciﬁcation does a good job of ﬁtting the U.S. data.
() , 2 12 σβ β π σε π yit i t it it it aa =++ + +
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Figure 8. Volatility of Output Growth in the United States and Its Main Explanatory
Variables, 1965–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Datastream.
a. Estimated from equation 2 using panel data for the G-7, excluding Japan.
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movements in inflation, and how much is due to the common time com-
ponents. The second panel shows the fitted value of output volatility
(repeated from the first panel), together with the inflation component,
a2σπit. This panel makes clear that the increase in inflation volatility
accounts for the reversal in trend from the early 1970s to the early 1980s.
The third panel shows the fitted value of output volatility (again repeated
from the ﬁrst panel), together with the common time component, βt. This
suggests a steady underlying trend decrease from 1960 on.
In short, this decomposition suggests a trend decrease in output volatil-
ity, temporarily interrupted by an increase in inﬂation volatility. Under that
interpretation, the sharp decline in output volatility in the 1980s appears to
be associated with a sharp decline in inflation volatility at that time. To get
a better understanding of both the trend decrease and the temporary rever-
sal in output volatility, the next section goes one level down and looks at
trends in the individual components of GDP.
A Disaggregated Look 
In his 1960 presidential address to the American Economic Association,
Arthur Burns argued that a trend decline in output volatility was indeed
under way.17 Composition effects (including the steady shift to services),
improvements in capital markets, the increasing ability of consumers to
smooth consumption in the face of variations in income, the increase in the
income tax, and stronger automatic stabilizers all led and, Burns argued,
would continue to lead to more economic stability.
He was clearly right about the trend. Was he right about the channels?
Here we make a ﬁrst pass at the answer. From a statistical accounting point
of view, one can think of the volatility of output as depending on three sets
of factors: the volatility of its components, their covariation, and their
relative weights. We look at each in turn.
Volatility of Output Components
Take the standard decomposition of GDP by type of purchase and type
of purchaser: consumption, investment, government spending, net exports,
Olivier Blanchard and John Simon 155
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denoted by Xi so that
where Yt is real GDP, measured quarterly. For each component we consider
two measures of volatility. 
The first is the same as for GDP earlier, namely, the rolling standard
deviation of the rate of growth of Xit, which we denote by σxit. This mea-
sure makes little sense, however, for inventories and net exports, which
change sign and are frequently close to zero. Thus we construct the rolling
standard deviation of growth for consumption, investment, and govern-
ment spending only.18
The second measures the volatility of a variable commonly called the
“growth contribution” of each component, which adjusts for the share of
the component in GDP. A very volatile component may have little effect on
overall output volatility if it accounts for a small share of GDP. The vari-
able is deﬁned as ∆Xit/Yt–1, and our measure of volatility is once again the
rolling standard deviation. Note that this measure is well defined for all
components of GDP regardless of whether they change sign or are close to
zero. Note also that the variable can be rewritten as (∆Xit/Xit–1)(Xit–1/Yt–1), so
that, if the share is stable at high frequency, the standard deviation will be
roughly equal to the share of the component of GDP times the standard
deviation of that component’s growth rate. For both volatility measures,
the window we use to compute standard deviations is again twenty quar-
ters. Rates of change are quarterly, not annual, rates.
The results are plotted in ﬁgures 9 and 10. The ﬁgures show that the two
measures move together at high frequency, reﬂecting the stability of the shares.
From ﬁgure 9 we draw the following conclusions:
—The volatility of government spending (and of fiscal policy in gen-
eral) was very high during the Korean War. It fell rapidly in the 1950s
and has remained low ever since.
—There is no clear trend in the volatility of net exports or in the volatil-
ity of inventory investment, although the latter was low in the 1990s. (This,
() , 3 YX ti t
i
=∑
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18. In parallel with our exploration of GDP, we have estimated AR processes for each
component. Although we do not present the results here, the general conclusion is the same
as for GDP. For the most part, the decrease in volatility comes from a decrease in the volatil-
ity of the shocks rather than from a change in dynamics.
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Figure 9. Volatilities of Components of GDP, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
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Figure 10. Volatilities of Components of Consumption and Investment, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Twenty-quarter rolling standard deviations of quarterly growth and growth contribution.
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0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 158together with the change in correlation reported below, suggests a recent
change in the behavior of inventory investment.)
—Most of the trend decrease in output volatility can be traced to a
decrease in the volatility of consumption and investment. After a large
decrease in the 1950s, consumption volatility has continued to decrease,
from about 0.75 percent in the 1960s to 0.30 percent in the late 1990s.
The decrease in investment volatility has been more limited. The stan-
dard deviation of our second measure is nearly the same in the late 1990s
as in the 1960s.
Given that much of the action comes from consumption and invest-
ment, figure 10 goes one step further in the disaggregation, to trace the
volatility of the components of consumption and investment. Relative
declines in the volatility of all three components of consumption—spend-
ing on durables, on nondurables, and on services—are roughly similar.
Their timing is slightly different, however, with much of the trend reversal
in consumption in the 1970s and the early 1980s coming from consump-
tion of services.
We think these are slightly surprising findings. One might have
expected improvements in financial markets to lead consumers to choose
a smoother consumption path, thus leading to smoother consumption of
services and nondurables. But one would also have expected an improved
ability to borrow and lend to lead to a stronger stock-flow adjustment for
purchases of durables, and thus potentially to more volatility of durables
purchases. This, however, does not seem to be the case.
The two series for investment volatility exhibit quite different patterns.
Nonresidential investment shows a steady decline and a limited increase in
the 1970s. Residential investment volatility shows a steady increase from
the 1950s to the mid-1980s and a sharp decrease after that. The latter coin-
cides with the elimination of interest rate ceilings on savings and loan
institutions (the end of Regulation Q), making it a plausible candidate
explanation. 
Correlations of Output Components
The standard deviation of output depends not only on the standard devi-
ations of its components, but also on their correlations. To show what has
happened in this regard, we construct the correlation of each component
with final sales (GDP minus inventory investment) or, more specifically,
Olivier Blanchard and John Simon 159
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the correlation of ∆Xit/Yt–1 with ∆St/Yt–1, where St is final sales. Again we
use a window of twenty quarters.
These results are shown in ﬁgure 11. The correlations change over time
(as we would expect if the subsamples are dominated by different shocks,
with different implications for the correlation between each component
and final sales). But except for one series, they do not show clear trends.
The exception is the correlation between inventory investment and sales.
Until the mid-1980s, inventory investment tended to move with sales,
leading to a higher variance of production than of sales—a fact studied at
length in the research on inventory behavior. Since the mid-1980s,
inventory investment has become countercyclical, leading to a decline in
the variance of output relative to sales. This fact, which Kahn, McConnell,
and Perez-Quiros have examined, must have come from a change in the
inventory management methods of firms. It is clearly one of the factors
behind the decrease in output volatility in the 1980s, although only the last
in a long series of structural changes.19
Composition Effects
The composition of GDP has changed substantially over the last fifty
years. The three main changes, at the level of disaggregation examined
here, are an increase in the share of (high-volatility) fixed nonresidential
investment, from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1950 to 13.7 percent in 2000; a
decrease in the share of nondurables consumption, from 33.4 percent to
20.2 percent; and a mirror increase in the share of (low-volatility) con-
sumption of services, from 21.7 percent to 39.4 percent.
To characterize the effects of composition on output volatility, a sim-
ple approach is to compute the volatility of a counterfactual series for
output growth, using 1947 shares rather than current shares to weight the
components. Specifically, we construct the counterfactual output growth
series as follows. Write the rate of growth of output as
19. There is a puzzle here as well. The change in correlation roughly coincides with the
introduction of just-in-time inventory management methods, which have led to lower
inventory-to-sales ratios. It is not clear, however, why they should have led the correlation
to change from positive to negative. Better tracking and forecasting of sales, and the ability
to maintain a stable inventory-to-sales ratio, should lead to more procyclical, not less
procyclical, inventory investment.
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Figure 11. Correlations between Final Sales Growth and the Growth of Its
Components, 1952–2000a
Source: Authors’calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Twenty-quarter rolling correlations.
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terms in the second sum are the terms that change sign in the sample (net
exports and inventory investment). We can rewrite this expression as
where αit–1 is the share of component i at time t – 1. Once again, con-
structing ∆Xjt/Xjt–1 does not make much sense for inventories and net
exports, as they are frequently around zero. Consequently, we treat them
separately. We then construct the counterfactual series for output growth as 
where αi1947 is the 1947 share of component i. We then construct rolling
standard deviations for actual and counterfactual output series. There is no
need to present a ﬁgure, as the two series are nearly indistinguishable. The
different changes in composition nearly offset each other, and the ﬁnal val-
ues are within 0.05 percent of each other. Composition effects therefore
have little to do with the general pattern of output volatility over the last
ﬁfty years.
Conclusions
We have documented the long and large decline in output volatility over
the last half-century. We have shown that this phenomenon does not have
one, but many proximate causes. Among them are a steady decrease in
investment volatility and, even more so, of consumption volatility; a
decrease in the volatility of government spending early on; and a change
from procyclical to countercyclical inventory investment in the 1990s.
Many questions remain, however.
The ﬁrst set of questions concerns the deeper causes of the decrease in
volatility, from the role of policy (especially monetary policy) to the role
of structural changes (especially changes in financial markets). Our find-
ings suggest that monetary policy has played a complex role. On the one
hand, the trend decrease in output volatility from 1950 on does not lend
( ) ( / )* / / , –– – 6 1 1947 1 1 ∆∆ ∆ YY X X X Y tt i i t i t j tt
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a dramatic recent improvement in the conduct of monetary policy—that is,
of a Greenspan effect. On the other, the dramatic decrease in output
volatility in the mid-1980s can be interpreted in two ways, both related to
monetary policy.
The first is that this decrease was indeed the result of smarter counter-
cyclical monetary policy, leading to better output stabilization from the
1980s on. This explanation runs into a puzzle, however. Given the lags in
the effects of monetary policy on output, one would have expected better
monetary policy to show up primarily as shorter-lived effects of shocks
on output, and thus as a decrease in the AR(1) coefficient in the univari-
ate AR representation. There is no evidence that this has been the case.20
The other interpretation is that the decrease in output volatility was asso-
ciated with—and may have been largely caused by—the decrease in inﬂa-
tion volatility that occurred around the same time. But even this second
interpretation implies a role for monetary policy. The increased stability of
inflation is likely to be have been due, in large part, to better monetary
policy.
Our ﬁndings also suggest a role for improvements in ﬁnancial markets
in reducing consumption and investment volatility. But here again the
argument is not straightforward. On theoretical grounds, it is not obvious
that more efficient financial markets should lead to lower consumption
volatility. Although, for given interest rates, they plausibly lead to a
decrease in the volatility of consumption services and nondurables, they
also allow consumers to adjust faster toward their desired stock of
durables, leading, other things equal, to more volatility of spending on
consumer durables. The same argument applies to investment. The evi-
dence is, however, of a decrease in volatility in all components of con-
sumption and investment.
The issue of the relative roles of monetary policy and financial market
improvements in reducing output volatility is a fascinating one. In that
respect, developments in Japan in the 1990s are both intriguing and incon-
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20. A more sophisticated argument is that, despite the lags in monetary policy, better pol-
icy might have reduced the variance of measured output shocks, leading agents to expect
shorter-lived effects of the underlying shocks on GDP, and thus to react less to these shocks
in the first place. But even in this case, better policy should be reflected both in a smaller
variance of measured output shocks and in shorter-lasting effects of shocks on output—
and thus in a decrease in the AR(1) coefﬁcient.
0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 163clusive. As we saw, output volatility increased substantially in Japan in the
1990s. But was that increase due to monetary policy or to changes in ﬁnan-
cial markets (or to something else)? The answer is far from obvious. Mon-
etary policy, both current and anticipated, was clearly limited by the
constraint that interest rates be nonnegative—the liquidity trap. And
because of the problems Japanese banks were facing, intermediation was
clearly disrupted. Only a more disaggregated examination will help
attribute blame.
A second set of issues concerns the implications of our ﬁndings. We feel
reasonably confident in predicting from our results that the increase in
the length of expansions is here to stay. (This, however, is not a predic-
tion that the United States will not go through a recession in the near
future, nor do we claim that the New Economy has eliminated the business
cycle.) The decrease in output volatility appears sufficiently steady and
broad based that a major reversal appears unlikely. This implies a much
smaller likelihood of recessions.
Lower output volatility suggests lower risk, and thus changes in risk
premiums, in precautionary saving, and so on. Interestingly, however, the
decrease in output volatility has not been reflected in a parallel decrease in
asset price volatility. As others have documented, there is little evidence of
a trend in the volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.21 Ultimately,
of course, what matters is not aggregate risk but the risk borne by indi-
viduals. We do not know what has happened to the volatility of idiosyn-
cratic shocks during the period. We intend to explore all these avenues in
the near future.
164 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
21. This is not necessarily a puzzle. If we think of the better use of monetary policy as
one of the factors behind the decrease in output volatility, stronger stabilization efforts
may require sharper movements in interest rates, and thus potentially stronger movements
in asset prices. There is, however, little evidence of increased volatility in real interest
rates, let alone nominal interest rates.
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Discussion
Benjamin M. Friedman: The goal of Olivier Blanchard and John
Simon’s paper is to study the business cycle, focusing in particular on
aggregate real output in the United States. Their principal finding is that
the shocks affecting output growth have become less volatile in recent
years. The standard error of the autoregression that serves as their central
vehicle of analysis, estimated on a rolling-sample basis, has declined from
about 1 percent a quarter (4 percent annualized), on average from the
1950s through the mid-1980s, to roughly 
1⁄2 percent a quarter since then.
Because the average growth rate of real output for the entire sample, from
1947 through 2000, is 0.9 percent a quarter, this sharp decline in the
absolute magnitude of the estimated shocks obviously means that lately
there have been fewer quarters when the measured growth rate has been
less than zero. To the extent that movements of real GDP as measured by
the U.S. Department of Commerce capture the broadly based ﬂuctuations
in nonfinancial economic activity that the NBER business cycle dating
process emphasizes, there have therefore been fewer recessions. 
The immediate question is what to make of this finding. In their intro-
duction the authors say that their paper will “take up the question of
whether recessions are special . . . . whether what we have seen over the
last twenty years is simply the absence of large shocks and nothing more.”
They preview their conclusion as follows: “. . . this is not the case. The
measured decrease in output volatility has little to do with the absence of
large shocks in the recent past.” Later on they summarize their results by
stating, “The measured decline in output volatility is not due to the
absence of large shocks over the past twenty years. What it captures
165
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changes in GDP growth.”
To be sure, one should not read the results of Blanchard and Simon’s
paper to say that the infrequency of recessions in the United States over the
last two decades has reflected the absence of large shocks and nothing
more. But the absence of large shocks certainly is a major part of what
the authors have to report. Inspection of the estimated residuals from the
authors’ equation (which Olivier Blanchard was kind enough to provide
to me) shows that, without exception, every one of the nine ofﬁcial NBER
recessions in the United States since World War II has involved at least one
negative residual larger (in absolute value) than the 0.9 percent mean quar-
terly growth rate of real output. And in the past there were plenty of large
residuals other than just during recession episodes. Including both posi-
tives and negatives, from 1947 through 1984 their results show ﬁfty-eight
estimated residuals larger than 0.9 percent. 
By contrast, since 1985 only four of their estimated quarterly residuals
have exceeded 0.9 percent; two of these were positive and two negative.
And one of the two large negatives occurred during the lone recession the
United States has experienced during these years, that of 1990–91. (The
other was in the ﬁrst quarter of 1993.) Blanchard and Simon’s basic point
is that output has become less volatile, and this is surely true. But there is
no way to duck the fact that, in their estimated autoregression, the absence
of recessions is very much associated with the absence of large negative
shocks.
Yet another way of looking at the data, which the authors do not dis-
cuss, leads to the same conclusion. It is conventional to estimate regres-
sions for real output using quarterly data, presumably because the
Commerce Department reports GDP this way. But no economic theory of
which I am aware guarantees that the calendar quarter is the right level of
time aggregation for investigating the kinds of shocks that matter for busi-
ness cycles. A single large shock spread out over more than a single mea-
sured quarter would look in quarterly observations like a series of smaller
shocks occurring over a sequence of consecutive quarters.
Blanchard and Simon’s autoregression exhibits no meaningful serial
correlation. (The Durbin-Watson statistic is a comforting 2.05.) Nonethe-
less, from time to time there are runs of consecutive estimated negative
residuals, and these runs are also very much part of the story of recessions.
Of the nine recorded postwar recessions, seven have involved three or
166 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
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four or more negative residuals in succession. (The only two exceptions
each involved a “near run,” in which four out of five consecutive residu-
als were negative.) Moreover, the identiﬁcation of a recession with a run of
negative Blanchard-Simon residuals is not only almost necessary, but
almost sufficient as well. Only once in their sample spanning more than
200 quarterly observations does their regression exhibit three successive
negative residuals outside of an NBER recession period. And that episode
was during 1989, which numerous analyses have indicated was unusual,
and in particular recession-like, in a variety of ways.1
In sum, whether the matter is to be framed in terms of the absence of
large shocks or more generically in terms of reduced volatility, the result
from this part of the paper is clear: the time-series behavior of output in the
United States has changed (or, to anticipate the discussion below, has been
changing), and that change has a lot to do with the recent infrequency of
recessions. The broader question to be put to this part of Blanchard and
Simon’s analysis, however, is, What is learned from viewing the time
series of real output in this way—that is, through the lens of their first-
order autoregression? The regression, estimated over the full sample, has
an adjusted R2 of 0.11. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
is 0.34. (These ﬁgures are not reported in the paper. I am again grateful to
Olivier Blanchard for providing them.) Hence the fitted value of real out-
put growth for each quarter is simply the 0.9 percent mean adjusted by
one-third of whatever was the difference between the measured growth
rate and this mean in the previous quarter. All else is “shocks.” To put the
question in more quantitative terms, What do we learn from excluding
this 11 percent of the variation of real output growth, and focusing our
attention on the remaining 89 percent, that we did not already know from
looking at real output growth itself—as, indeed, Blanchard and Simon do
in much of the rest of the paper?
The most interesting part of Blanchard and Simon’s paper, and the part
that I think offers the greatest promise for future research, is the demon-
stration that the decline in the volatility of output growth (focusing now on
the raw series, not the estimated autoregression residuals) roughly lines up
with a decline in the volatility of price inflation. In particular, the match-
up with output volatility is distinctly better for the volatility of inflation
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room to investigate (although the authors do not do so) how familiar, sys-
tematic forces like monetary and ﬁscal policies, and understandable cate-
gories of shocks like energy price movements and other supply shocks, can
enter the central story of business cycles. 
For example, one longstanding view of how recessions come about in
the postwar U.S. economy is that the Federal Reserve makes them happen,
either deliberately or by overshooting the mark, but in either case through
the application of tight monetary policy. The presumed motivation for
that tight policy is, of course, the need to prevent inﬂation from developing
or to slow an inﬂation that has already begun. Hence recessions should be
observed following periods in which monetary and fiscal policies have
stimulated the economy beyond its productive capacity, or in which exoge-
nous movements in consumer spending or business investment (due to a
surge of conﬁdence, for example) have done the same, or perhaps both. A
separate but highly similar view is that recessions follow after an adverse
shock, such as a rise in oil prices, has reduced the economy’s ability to pro-
duce outputs from inputs at any given cost, and the central bank chooses
not to allow rising prices to absorb the entire backshift in the aggregate
supply curve. 
The rough correspondence shown in the lower panel of the authors’
ﬁgure 6 is consistent with either of these accounts of how recessions occur,
both of which assign a central role to monetary policy reacting to either the
reality or the anticipation of inflation. The correspondence is also consis-
tent with a quite different view, however: that recessions come and go for
reasons entirely independent of inflation, and that it is the fluctuation of
output, sometimes above the economy’s productive capacity and some-
times below, that then causes inﬂation to move up or down. 
As Blanchard and Simon rightly point out, in this context correlation
does not necessarily imply causality. Their response to this problem is to
turn to evidence from the other G-7 economies, using a panel regression
(omitting Japan) of moving-average output volatility on moving-average
inflation volatility and the moving-average inflation mean, allowing for
time effects. The result mirrors the finding for the United States alone
that is evident from figure 6: output volatility is systematically related to
inﬂation volatility, not to the inﬂation mean.
But the panel regression resolves the causality question no better than
a single equation for the United States would—nor, for that matter, any
168 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001
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sistent with the interpretation that shocks, some common across all six
countries and some not, create inflation; that central banks respond with
tight monetary policies that slow output growth; and that these episodes
of tight monetary policy in turn render output more volatile (perhaps in a
way that involves out-and-out recessions, perhaps not). But the results are
also consistent with the alternative account whereby movements in out-
put relative to capacity trigger movements in inﬂation, so that independent
forces that sometimes render output more volatile then cause inflation to
be more volatile as well. 
The authors’aim in turning to the panel regression is to control for any
such independent forces—for example, oil price shocks—that act in com-
mon across the six included economies. It is instructive that the results
hold up when they do so. But controlling for common supply effects (and
common demand effects, too) is not the same as resolving the causality
issue. On the assumption that the authors are right that what is involved
here is inflation volatility and not inflation itself, the panel regression is no
more informative than a single-country regression on the question of
whether we should be regressing output volatility on inflation volatility
or vice versa. 
Finally, the analysis at the end of the paper, focusing on changes in the
time-series behavior of individual components of aggregate spending (now
again for the United States only) is instructive in its own right. But it, too,
cannot resolve the more interesting question of whether output volatility is
driving inflation volatility or vice versa. At first blush, the finding that all
major components of U.S. GDP have shown less volatility in recent years
lends credence to the story that places Federal Reserve (over)reaction to
inflation at the heart of the matter. Otherwise, why would all of the com-
ponents have become less volatile over the last fifty years? Exogenous
shocks to spending, such as changes in consumer conﬁdence or in the “ani-
mal spirits” of entrepreneurs, would more likely have affected different
components of spending differently.
On closer inspection, however, the timing of the decline in volatility
does turn out to vary from one component of GDP to another. Moreover,
Blanchard and Simon themselves identify some, but far from all, of the
structural changes in the U.S. economy that plausibly have accounted for
the most salient reductions in output volatility for reasons other than the
response of monetary policy to inflation. For example, the sharp decline in
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the removal of Regulation Q interest ceilings (which they mention) and the
development of the secondary market for home mortgages (which they
do not). The steep decline in the volatility of consumer durables purchases
after the Korean War similarly corresponds to the removal of Regulation W
controls on consumer financing (which they also do not mention). Perhaps
the most interesting single element of what the authors ﬁnd is the dramatic
change in inventory behavior, in the mid-1980s, from what used to be
production unsmoothing—a phenomenon that runs counter to standard
economic theory—to production smoothing. As they rightly point out, this
development in particular has potentially important implications in the
context of many other discussions not pursued here.
But this component-by-component dissection of real GDP growth also
makes the pattern that Blanchard and Simon see in the data and choose to
emphasize throughout the paper—a trend decline in output volatility
throughout their half-century-long sample period, “temporarily interrupted
in the 1970s and 1980s”—appear less satisfactory as a comprehensive
description of what has happened. The volatility of spending on durable
consumption and that of both residential and nonresidential investment ini-
tially declined but then began to increase again starting around 1965.
Volatility of services consumption began a similar reversal in either 1967
or 1971, depending on how one reads the authors’ figure 10, reached a
peak in 1975, then declined to an even lower level through 1990, and
finally rose again through the mid-1990s. To be explicit, in each of these
cases the midsample reversal predated the first OPEC oil price increase
and the other familiar supply shocks of the 1970s. Of the ﬁve components
of GDP shown in figure 10, only for nondurable consumption does the
movement of volatility over time look much like a declining trend through-
out, with an interruption beginning in the 1970s and peaking in the
mid-1980s.
The subject of this paper is important. Within our lifetimes the death
of the business cycle has been foretold as often as the coming of the mes-
siah (perhaps because, in so many people’s minds, the two are identical).
Every run of a few good years produces much talk, much of it from the
business community and much of it fatuous, to the effect that new tech-
niques of business management, or improved understanding on the part
of policymakers, has relegated business cycles to the realm of historians.
Perhaps some day this will come to pass. In the meanwhile, as the cir-
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slowdown—companies that fail to meet overly optimistic earnings pro-
jections, or a down stock market, or an easing in the pace of industrial pro-
duction or housing starts or retail sales—and all such talk is readily
forgotten.
The more important questions, however—those that form the proper
basis for economic inquiry, as in this paper—persist. The world does not
always remain the same. Carefully documenting how it has changed, or is
changing, is an important task for economists. So is seeking to under-
stand the origins of those changes. The paper by Blanchard and Simon,
especially in its highlighting of the relationship between declining output
volatility and declining inflation volatility both in the United States and
elsewhere, points toward a useful direction in which to look.
General discussion: Several participants discussed how much of the
credit for decreased output volatility should be ascribed to better luck and
how much to policy. Gregory Mankiw suggested that the behavior of food
and energy prices during the 1970s was a piece of bad luck, which turned
into good luck in the 1990s. He believed the volatility of food and energy
prices relative to those of other goods, a measure of supply shocks, had
decreased in the past ten or fifteen years and was responsible for some of
the increase in stability. On the other hand, he acknowledged, a number
of studies have found that interest rates are much more responsive to inﬂa-
tion than they were in the past, suggesting that better monetary policy
should also get part of the credit. 
Alan Blinder agreed that improved Federal Reserve behavior is a can-
didate for explaining the dramatic reduction in volatility in the second half
of the 1980s. But, he suggested, this is not a fully satisfactory way to view
the performance of policy. One could argue that then–Fed Chairman Paul
Volcker’s crackdown on inﬂation in the early 1980s was important in cre-
ating a more stable environment later in the decade, but it was also a large
shock to output, increasing volatility in the short run. Blinder also found
it hard to understand the precise timing of the abrupt decline in volatility. 
Robert Gordon commented that the drop in volatility was likely to be in
part an artifact of using rolling regressions to estimate the output process.
A large ﬂuctuation in output has a large effect on estimated volatility at the
time it occurs and an opposite effect of the same magnitude when it drops
out of the sample five years later. The decline in volatility looks like a
Olivier Blanchard and John Simon 171
0099—03 BPEA /Blanchard  7/3/01  12:15  Page 171reflection of the dramatic inventory swing between the fourth quarter of
1982 and the first quarter of 1983. Hence not too much should be made
of the precise timing of changes in volatility. William Brainard suggested
that this problem could be avoided by using an explicitly time-varying
parameter model rather than rolling regressions.
Gordon observed further that the suggestion of a causal relation running
from inflation volatility to output volatility had a taste of déja vu, recalling
a famous New York Times headline of the mid-1970s: “Inflation triggers
recession.” We have learned that not all price shocks are adverse: some
are benign, decreasing rather than raising volatility. In recent years we
have experienced falling real import prices, an acceleration in the rate of
decline of computer prices (and higher productivity growth), and, for a
while, falling real energy and medical care prices. These have created an
environment in which the Federal Reserve could refrain from its normal
response to rapid output growth, which in past circumstances would have
been to create a spike in short-term interest rates, bringing on the next
recession.
Several panelists wondered how sensitive the authors’ results were to
particular observations or assumptions about the underlying processes.
Gordon would have preferred to omit the Korean War episode, because
consumption and government spending during that period were too pecu-
liar (and highly correlated) to be of general significance. George Perry
questioned the authors’decision to divide their sample period into halves
and assume a constant rate of growth for each. He noted that many
observers thought the underlying growth rate had varied significantly
within each of the two subperiods. Since the probability of a recession
and the expected length of an expansion are quite sensitive to this rate of
growth, such a reﬁnement might have resulted in a quite different picture.
For example, it seems plausible that the growth rate at the end of the 1960s
was relatively high; hence, according to the model, falling into a reces-
sion in 1970 was an extremely low probability event. 
Edmund Phelps found anomalous the paper’s conclusion that volatility
is much lower than it used to be, given that we recently experienced one of
the most powerful booms of the last 100 years. Robert Hall agreed: he
found it hard to say we have been in a period of low volatility when recent
ﬁve- and ten-year forecast errors have been huge. Hall concluded that the
focus of the paper’s analysis was on movements in real GDP of too high
frequency, and he thought it would be more appropriate to look at the
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decline in volatility on the basis of a small sample; after all, from 1875 to
1929 volatility had decreased before shooting up during the 1929 crisis.
Robert Shimer suggested that inflation and output variability may have
common determinants (such as the 1970s oil shock) and that it would have
been more appropriate to treat both as dependent variables rather than try
to explain one with the other.
Gordon and Hall expressed surprise at the insignificant effect of
changes in the composition of output over a period that has seen a mas-
sive shift from factory work to desk jobs. Phelps would have liked to have
seen an analysis of changes in the volatility of the employment (or the
unemployment) rate, both for its intrinsic interest and as a possible expla-
nation of changes in output volatility. He conjectured that employment has
become a more sluggish variable, in part because of changes in the com-
position of output, in part because of institutional changes, and in part
because of developments that we need to understand better, such as the fact
that quit rates have decreased. Perry was interested in the results on inven-
tory, where it appeared the correlation with output has reversed. If, as is
widely believed, firms are getting much better at anticipating sales and
adjusting production quickly, one might have expected the correlation to
have become more positive. 
Susan Collins thought that a more detailed look at the components of
output (investment, inventory, and so forth) in European countries would
be informative. She believed that a quite different picture would emerge
from that in the United States in the aggregate.
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